Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Kay Goff v. Annette Goff : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David K. Winder; Strong and Hanni; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant.
Richard Richards; Attorney for Plaintiff and respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Goff v. Goff, No. 13893.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1066

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF L ^ I ^ R Y
)DEC9

KAYGOFF,
Plaintiff
_vg_

197R

and Respondent, I
BRiGIIAM <¥©UN$H*NIVERS!TY

J. keif en Qakfcaw School
I
/£&$?

ANNETTE DOBLE GOFF,

Defendant and Appellant. I

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Second District Court for Weber County
Honorable Calvin Gould, District Judge

DAVID K. WINDER
STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant amd
Appellcmt
RICHARD RICHARDS
670 28th Street
Ogden, Utah 84403
Attorney for Plamtiff and
Respondent

n

\f*
*

-

r* 3

T%

|
1^
1^
V C D 1.i M197 S

CU?t Supram© Court, i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

9

POINT I.
THE PROPER TEST FOR DETERMINING
GUEST STATUS UNDER THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE WAS WHETHER THE COMPENSATION WAS THE CHIEF INDUCEMENT FOR THE CARRIAGE BASED UPON
THAT TEST, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE
FOUND AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
THE PLAINTIFF WAS A GUEST IN HIS
SON'S AUTOMOBILE

9

POINT II.
NO BUSINESS TRIP WAS INVOLVED AT
THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT THAT
COULD REMOVE THE PLAINTIFF FROM
THE EFFECT OF THE GUEST STATUTE .... 22
CONCLUSION

25
CASES CITED

Eyre v. Bnrdette,
8 Utah 2d 166, 330 P.2d 126 (1958)

16

Greenhalgh v. Green,
16 Utah 2d 221, 398 P.2d 691 (1965)

13, 14, 15

Jensen v. Mower,
4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.2d 683 (1956)

9, 10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

.
Mukasey v. Aaron, ....
20 Utah 2d 383, 438 P.2d 702 (1968)
Smith v. Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16,
376 P.2d 541 (1962)

Page
.22, 23, 24

10, 11, 12, 13, 18

Willden v. Kennecott Copper Corporation,
25 Utah 2d 96, 476 P.2d 687 (1970)
..:....;..15, 16
TEXTS
U.C.A., 1953, 41-9-2

9

39 A.L.E. 3d 1224

16

39 A.L.B. 3d 1240

20

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KAY GOFF,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs—

\

Case No.
57116

ANNETTE DOBLE GOFF,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT'APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action by plaintiff-respondent (hereafter called Kay Goff or plaintiff) against defendantappellant (hereafter called Annette Doble Goff or defendant) for damages for plaintiff's bodily injuries and
which resulted from an automobile accident that occurred on January 22,1973. The sole issue involved before
the Trial Court and which is involved on this appeal concerns whether at the time the accident occurred the plaintiff was or was not a guest and as that term is defined in
41-9-2, U.C.A. 1953.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial of this case was heard on September 10,
1974 before the Honorable Calvin Gould, in and for
Weber County, Utah, sitting without a jury, the same
1
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having been waived by both parties. Thereafter and
by Memorandum Decision dated September 20, 1974, the
Court found in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant and thereafter formal Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment were entered.

BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the Trial Court's verdict and seeks a Judgment in defendant's favor and as
against the plaintiff of no cause of action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves a claim for damages for personal injuries by the plaintiff and against the defendant
and relating to an automobile accident that occurred on
January 22, 1973. At the trial the attorneys for both
parties waived a jury and tried the only issue that was
in dispute to the Trial Judge. As stipulated to in the
Trial Transcript, the defendant's attorney agreed that
there was liability in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant and if the plaintiff was found not to be
a "guest" and as defined in 41-9-2, U.C.A. 1953. The
defendant's attorney further stipulated that if any recovery was allowable that it should be in the amount of
$10,000.00, those being the policy limits of the defendant's insurance policy, and since the injuries suffered
by the plaintiff entitled him to at least that amount. By
reason of these stipulations, the trial was a short one
and only covered 36 pa^ges of transcript.
Considering that the Trial Judge ruled in the plaintiff's favor and against the defendant, the defendant
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recognizes that this court must consider the facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Therefore, most
of this Statement of Facts will be just as the Trial Judge
stated what he believed the facts to be and as contained
in his Memorandum Decision, most of which is quoted
as follows:
"The facts surround a family relationship of
mother, father, two sons and the fiancee of each
son. The father is one Kay Goff, who had some
earlier bodily injuries, and who had received a
written communication to appear before the Bailroad Eetirement Board in Salt Lake City. Kay
Goff and his wife Sarah Goff reside in Riverdale, Utah, a suburb of Ogden, in a residence
near the North Gate of Hill Air Force Base. John
XJ. Goff is their 29 year old son, who appears
quite uneducated and was employed as a garbage
hauler for a private refuse company. The son
John owns an automobile, but the parents do
not own an automobile. Annette Goff was the fiancee of John's brother, now married to John's
brother. John's fiancee, Dianne, and Annette
were engaged in selling 'Tupperware', and were
required to be in Salt Lake City, Utah, for a Tupperware sales meeting on Monday morning. The
Sunday evening prior to the meeting, Annette
asked John for the use of John's car to make a
trip to Salt Lake City, Utah. John agreed, but
next morning instead of loaning the car, John
elected to 'lay off from work Monday and drive
Annette and Dianne to Salt Lake City for the
meeting. Upon learning of the trip, Kay Goff,
needing to travel to the Railroad Retirement
Board in Salt Lake City, asked if he could go
and offered to pay for the gas if he and Sarah
Goff could ride to Salt Lake City, Utah. Next
"
morning John arose early and traveled to his
place of employment to arrange his layoff. He
$
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

then returned to Kay Goff 's residence, whereupon he was given $5.00 by Sarah for the trip. John
then traveled into Ogden to a service station at
13th and Wall Avenue and used $4.00 of the
money for gas, and placed $1.00 in his pocket
which he used for lunch later in the week. After
purchasing gas, John picked up Annette and Dianne at their homes, which were within a few
blocks of the gasoline station. It should be noted
at this point that John had access to the Interstate Highway 15 to Salt Lake City via 12th
Street, and could have entered 1-15 to Salt Lake
City at several locations without returning to the
home of his parents in Eiverdale. When asked
why he returned to his parents' home, he answered 'They give me $5.00 for gas.' John did return to his parents' home, entered the driveway,
and left the car to go into the house to get his
parents. At this point Annette slid under the
steering wheel, it being her intention to drive the
car to Salt Lake City. John brought his parents
out of the house and Kay and Sarah entered the
car and sat in the rear passenger compartment.
Annette, Dianne and John all sat in the front
passenger compartment with Annette driving.
"Approaching Salt Lake City, Utah, near the
Beck Street exit from 1-15, Annette was distracted by an accident scene on the northbound leg of
Interstate 15 and ran into the rear of a car directly in the traffic lane ahead of her. The collision caused serious injuries to Kay Goff for
which he seeks recovery."
As indicated above by Judge Gould in his Memorandum Decision, the plaintiff's son and the owner of the
car involved in the accident, John Goff, did testify that
the reason he returned to his parents' home to give his
father a ride was because his parents gave him $5.00 for

4
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gas. (TR 31) This testimoney was elicited from John
Goff by plaintiff's attorney. However, on crossexamination by defendant's attorney, the following questions and answers were given on this same general subject matter by John Goff.
"CROSS-EXAMINATION
"BY MR. MIDGLEY:
"Q. Now, Mr. Goff, when, on the morning I believe it was of the Monday yon happened to
mention to your folks that you were going to Salt
Lake?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And Annette had asked you the day before
if she could drive your car to Salt Lake?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And you said yes?
"A.

(Nods head.)

"Q. Is that correct?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And you knew that Dianne was going with
Annette to the Tupperware meeting in Salt Lake?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And so if they took your car, I presume you
assumed they would put the gas in it, is that
right?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And you were engaged to Dianne at that
time?
"A. Yes.

I
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"Q. So then you decided you would drive down
with them?
"A.

Yes.

' •••^\^

v

"

"Q. Because you were engaged to Dianne and
that would be a nice pleasure trip, wouldn't it?
"A. Yes
v ;•
"Q. Yeah. And then as I understand it, your
mother and father said Veil, as long as you are
going to Salt Lake, can we ride down'?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And you said 'certainly'?
"A. Yes.
"Q And you would have taken them down
whether they gave you any money or not,
wouldn't you?
"A.
Yes
"Q. Surely. But they offered you $5.00 to help
out with the expense of the car ?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And they have done that before, haven't
they?
"A. Yes.
"Q. I believe your dad said that he always likes
to pay his own way. So then you had already
agreed with your folks that they could ride to
Salt Lake City with you?
"A. (Nods head.)
"Q. So you went and got the gas and picked the
girls up and then you went back to pick your folks
up?
"A. Yes.
6
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"Q. Now, having told them they could ride with
you, why you would have gone and picked them
up anyhow, whether they had given you any
money or not, wouldn't you?
"A.

{Nods head.)

"Q. You would like to keep your word with
them, I guess, wouldn't you?
"A.

Yes/'

(TR 32-34 emphasis added)

The record is quite clear that John Goff did not ask
his father or parents for the $5.00 nor did he ever condition their being allowed to ride in his car upon them
giving him the $5.00. This appears from the testimony
of Sarah Goff (plaintiff's wife) who testified on this
subject matter as follows:
"Q. So as I understand it, you and your husband asked if you could ride down so that your
husband could go to the railroad?
"A.

(Nods head.)

"Q. Is that correct?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And you just volunteered and gave him
$5.00?
"A.

Yes, we give him $5.00.

"Q. John didn't ask you for it, you just gave it
to him?
"A.

We just gave it to him." (TR 24)

To some extent the testimony of the plaintiff at the
trial contradicts the testimony of his wife just quoted,
although it was clear from his pretrial deposition that
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his testimony on this subject agreed with her's. His testimony in his deposition was as follows:
"Q. Now when you say you gave John the
$5.00—
': "A. Yes, sir. "'••'•'
"Q. —what was the reason for that?
"A. To pay for my wife and I going on the trip
,/•:, down there with him. I had to be hauled around.
"Q. Well, you just didn't want to be a freeloader?
"A. That's right. We always pay. That's right.
"Q. And you just offered $5.00 to pay for the
expense?
"A. Well, we paid $5.00.
"Q. That was just to help with the expense of
the gasoline and the car?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Had John demanded $5.00 from you?
"A. No." (Dep. of Plaintiff pp 5 and 6.)
Concerning this deposition, it is to be noted that
both parties agreed at the conclusion of the trial that
the Trial Judge could consider the deposition of the
plaintiff. (TR 36) It is further to be noted that at the
time of the accident, and in addition to the others in the
car who are mentioned by Judge Gould in his Memorandum Decision that there was also present Shane Schoolcraft, a four-year old grandchild of the plaintiff and his
wife, who was sitting with them in the back seat of the

ear.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROPER TEST FOR DETERMINING GUEST STATUS U N D E R THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE WAS WHETHER
THE COMPENSATION WAS THE CHIEF
INDUCEMENT FOR THE CARRIAGE.
BASED UPON THAT TEST, THE COURT
SHOULD HAVE FOUND AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS A
GUEST IN HIS SON'S AUTOMOBILE.
The section of the statute which is involved in this
case is as follows:
"41-9-2. 'Guest7 Defined — For the purpose of
this section the term 'guest' is hereby defined as
being a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle
without giving compensation therefor."
The first Utah case to consider the question of "compensation" was Jensen v. Mower, 4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.
2d 683 (1956). In the Jensen case, the defendant driver
had posted an advertisement at his place of employment
seeking riders, and he had quoted a weekly price for
transportation which was comparable to bus fare. Plaintiff and others agreed to carriage under those terms and
it was further part of the understanding that the weekly rate would be charged whether the plaintiff rode or
not and as long as the defendant drove. There were no
facts in the Jensen case to indicate any basis for the
carriage other than that the defendant wished to be paid
and that the plaintiff agreed to pay a particular amount
in return .for the transportation. On those facts, the
Trial Court in the Jensen case did find compensation

f
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had been paid sufficient to take the plaintiff out from
under the Guest Statute and the Supreme Court affirmed that finding. However, the Supreme Court in the
Jensen case was careful to make it clear that a rider
didn't cease to be a guest in every circumstance where
money was paid to the owner or driver, and on this subject matter the Court stated as follows:
"As indicated in the language quoted from Am.
Jur. the cases turn not on whether money is received or paid as a result of carrying the rider,
but upon the fact that the money or other consideration was given to the driver, not as a gratuity or in appreciation but rather as an inducement for making the trip for the rider or furnishing carriage for the ride. If the driver extends
the courtesy of a ride to a friend without more
or takes on a hiker overtaken on the highway,
the status of guest in either case is not replaced
by that of passenger if gas is purchased, meals
purchased or cash given to assist the driver in
meeting the expenses of the trip. Such rider is
not in the car because of any compensation or
payment which induced the driver to give the
ride. That the driver had already done."
The Jensen case differs, of course, from the instant
case inasmuch as the only inducement for the ride being
granted in the Jensen case was on monetary considerations and there was no countervailing question of social
incentive for the ride and as there is in the instant case.
A case decided after the Jensen case and which involved a situation where there was both a monetary and
a social inducement for the ride was Smith v. FrcmJclm,
14 Utah 2d 16, 376 P. 2d., 541 (1962). In the Smith case,
10
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the evidence was thai i^u. u n defendant and uie plain
tiff's decedent were young women and cousins who resided in Tooele, Utah. On the date in question in that
case, the deceased told the defendant that she needed !<•
;rii h- Sah i..ike from Tooele to ohtain a loaa and asked
the defendant i<» drive her th'*re. When the defendant
advised the plaintiff's decedent that she did not have
any money for gasoline, the deceased agreed to pay $2.00
so that gas could be obtained and the defendant indicated that she thought this amount \v«:-i!d he sufficient
to buy gas for the trip. After the youuu; women had
come to Salt Lake City and were returning to Tooele,
the accident occurred and the plaintiff's decedent was
killed as a result thereof.
t MI Hie j'aHs just recited, the Tihi. t'ourt submitted
the issue of whether ot not the plaintiff's decedent wa>
a guest to the jury. Tin* jury found that she was a guest
and in favor of Hie defendant. Upon appeal, the plaintiff contended, among other points, that the Trial Court
should have ruled as a matter of law that she was not
a guest. The Supreme Court rejected that argument
and affirmed the Judgment entered in favor of the defendant in ihr Trial Tourl. Considering that the jur>
had ruled as it did in the Smith ease, the majority decision, authored by Justice Crockett, did not find it necessary to decide whether the Trial Court properly could
have ruled as a matter of law that the decedent was a
guest on those facts and therefore removed that issue1
from the jury. In their concurring opinions in Hie Smith
case, both Justices Wade and Henriod stated it as their
opinion that the evidence was susceptible of <ml\ one in
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terpretation on this issue and this was that the decedent
was a guest as a matter of law. Therefore, they concluded that that issue should not have been submitted
to the jury at all.
In his majority opinion in the Smith case, Justice
Crockett further refined the test relating to compensation and which had been earlier enunciated in the Jensen case and as it now applied to a situation where both
a monetary and social inducement existed for the carriage. On this subject matter, Justice Crockett stated
as follows:
"The test is simple to state and under most circumstances is easy to apply: a passenger for hire
is one who pays for his ride; a guest is one who
is furnished a ride free of charge. The former
is in the nature of a business transaction for
money; whereas the latter is motivated by other
considerations, usually of a social nature. Difficulties are encountered where both factors are
present in such a way that it does not appear with
sufficient certainty to justify a ruling as a matter of law either that the rider was a guest or
a passenger for hire. Where such uncertainty
exists, the definition given by Sec. 41-9-2, U.C.A.
1953, that a guest is 'a person who accepts a ride
in any vehicle without giving compensation therefor,' does not provide the conclusive answer. The
question arises as to what constitutes 'compensation' sufficient to change what normally would
be a guest to a passenger for hire.
f
"It must be conceded that where it is shown that
the rider is basically a social guest, neither the
giving of just 'any compensation,' which might
be some inconsequential amount of money or
other consideration of value, nor even the shar12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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,;,t_, i>\ expenses, merely in Mtcia! reciprocation
for the ride, would change the relationship to
that of passenger for hire. The phrase 'compensation therefor' as used in the statute means compensation for1 the^ ride. Therefore, it would have
to be sufficient money (or other thing of value)
that it reasonably could be supposed that the
parties so regarded it. But whether there is profli <n the transaction is obviously not the determining factor. Vvhere payment for the ride is
the main inducement for it, the fact that there
may also exist some social incentive which makes
giving the ride enjoyable or desirable for the
drivei* would not change its character to that of
host and guest.
" I Vom our consideration of this subject and the
authorities which have dealt with it, wo are persuaded that the sound and practical view is that
the determination should be made1 on tin1 basis
of which was the chief inducement for giving the
ride.'' (emphasis added)
The later case of GreenhalgJi v. Green, \u Utah lid
221, 398 P.2d 691 (1965), involved another fact situation
where the plaintiff passenger had. agreed to pay and
did pay a stun for gas on tin- trip and hefore the accident in (juesthm. !n the GreenhalgJicase, the facts were
undisputed and were as follows: The plaintiff, Greenhalgh, the defendant and a third person had jointly
planned a deer hunt similar to one they had enjoyed before. The defendant was to supply the camper ami the
other two a g w d io hhare ail costs. Durinj; the course
of their Irin, the defendant was driving an 1 oecame involved in :re. accident causing the plaintiff's injuries.
Prior Jo the accident, the plaintiff had paid $6.45 for

I?
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gas. On the facts just recited, the Trial Court (through
then District Court Judge EUett) granted a summary
judgment in favor of the defendant and on the basis
that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not be other
than a guest and under these circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision and in a per curiam
decision stated as follows:
"It is axiomatic that when a trip is for a social
purpose, not conditioned on contribution for the
benefit of the carrier, the passengers are guests
though they agree to share the costs of the trip
or purchase gas, oil or meals on the trip. The
fact that a passenger pays traveling expenses as
an act of social reciprocation, courtesy or amenity
does not make a paying passenger one who otherwise might be a guest.
"Green was not induced to provide the truck for
the hunting trip because plaintiff paid $6.45 for
gas. Even sharing costs, Green was supplying
his truck free of charge. This trip was social.
It was a common courtesy for plaintiff to share
the gas expense. Plaintiff clearly was a guest
and not a passenger for hire, and a reasonable
man could not find otherwise. Hence, the summary judgment was not error.
"Plaintiff bases his entire case on Smith v,
Franklin. There the passenger, as distinguished
from this case, induced the car owner to carry
her. The jury found the passenger to be a guest.
That case is not a precedent or a rule that cases
involving the Utah Guest Statute always are to
be determined by a jury. The judge, in his discretion, gave the case to the jury. The appeal
was on alleged erroneous instructions. This
court is well aware that a summary judgment
14
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cannot be given if there exists a genuine issue of
fact. But no issue of fact exists when patently
it is clear that plaintiff was a guest."
A case decided still later and which touches on this
same question was Willden v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 25 Utah 2d 96, 476 P.2d 687 (1970). In the
Willden case, the plaintiff, who was an employee of
Boyles Brothers Drilling Company, was injured on the
job and he was then taken to a medical facility nearby,
maintained by the defendant Kennecott. Later, the
plaintiff was transported in an ambulance of Kennecott's to Salt Lake City for further treatment and during the course of this trip an accident occurred causing
further injuries to the plaintiff and for which he brought
that lawsuit. The evidence further indicated in the Willden case that the defendant charged $7.50 for its ambulance service of the kind involved and that such
amount would have been billed to the plaintiff and he
would have been required to pay that amount. On these
facts, the Trial Judge in the Willden case granted a
Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant finding
as a matter of law that the plaintiff was still a guest.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that a jury question existed on that issue. Justices Henriod and Callister dissented and would have affirmed the Trial
Court's finding. In the majority opinion, authored by
Justice Crockett, it was pointed out that there were
countervailing considerations of Kennecott's being a
Good Samaritan in furnishing the ride on one hand and
on the other in wishing to obtain the $7.50 for the carriage. Under those circumstances, the Court stated that
15
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the issue should be submitted to the jury for them to
make a determination as to "which was the chief inducement for giving the ride", (emphasis added) See also
Eyre v. Bwdette, 8 Utah 2d 166, 330 P.2d 126 (1958),
and a lengthy annotation on this subject matter entitled
"Payment on Expense-Sharing Basis as Affecting Guest
Status of Automoblie Passenger", 39 A.L.E.3d 1224.
Turning from the authorities just mentioned to the
facts in the instant case, it is apparent that the Trial
Court erred in finding in the instant case that the plaintiff was not a guest. In fact, it appears from the Court's
Memorandum Decision that the Court may have been
mistaken as to the legal standard to be applied in a case
of this kind, that being the one enunciated in the Smith
case and the other authorities cited above and which
makes critical a determination as to what was the "chief
inducement" for giving the ride and where both a social
and a monetary inducement are involved. One of Judge
Gould's findings recited in his Memorandum Decision
was as follows:
"(2) That the parties intended the $5.00 as an
inducement not for making the trip, but for
furnishing carriage for the ride to Kay Gof f.''
It is clear from the authorities cited above that it
is not sufficient that it merely have been an inducement
for the carriage. Bather, it must have been the chief inducement. From Judge Gould's finding, it appears that
he did not make this critical distinction, although considering the evidence before him it is evident that he
could not have found that it was the chief inducement.

16
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It is true that there was evidence before the Trial
Court that the reason that John Goff returned to his
parents' home was because of the payment of the $5.00.
John Goff's response to a question on that subject matter is quoted in the Trial Judge's Memorandum Decision. However, it is also of some consequence to note
that this response and the question to which the response
was given are somewhat ambiguous and as they concern
the inducement for granting the carriage. That is, it
does appear from this answer of John Goff's that, at
least, one of the reasons for him going out of his way
and up to his parents' home to pick them up was that
they had given him this money. He didn't testify this
was his only reason nor does the question asked and
response given relate to why John Goff took his father
in the car to Salt Lake City. Certainly, this answer does
not establish that the chief reason for his father being
transported at the time of the accident was because the
father had given $5.00 to John Goff. On the contrary,
the only testimony on that subject matter from John
Goff was that he would have made the trip regardless of
whether or not the money had been paid. On two occassions while being cross-examined by defendant's attorney, John Goff stated that he would have taken his father regardless of whether or not the latter had paid him
any money. This was the only testimony that went directly to that issue and that was given at the trial and
it is very clear from this testimony that there can only
be one conclusion as to the chief inducement for the carriage. Since John Goff would have taken his father
whether or not he had been paid the $5.00, it follows in-

ff
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escapably that the chief inducement was a consideration other than his being paid this money.
It is clear from the Supreme Court's Opinion in the
Smith case, and to a lesser extent from language found
in other cases, that the "chief inducement" test requires
that "except for" the payment of the money, the carriage
would not have been allowed. As just noted, and considering the unrebutted testimony of John Goff on this
subject matter, it is evident that the ride would have
been given to the father regardless of the payment of
the $5.00. It is also obvious from other testimony that
the money was paid not in a commercial sense but that
it was paid as an act of reciprocation, in order to aid
the son to eliminate any possibility that the father
would be a "free-loader" in making the trip and without having paid something to his son.
While it is apparent from decisions of this Court
that the issue is one to be submitted to the trier of fact
and if there is any evidence to sustain a finding that
the plaintiff is not a guest, that issue should not have
been ruled upon by the Trial Judge in the instant case.
This is so because the testimony and circumstances were
such that the Trial Court should have ruled as a matter
of law that plaintiff was a guest. In addition to what
has been stated above, there are other factors which compel the result and these will be stated in the paragraphs
that follow.
1. The evidence is clear that the trip that was being
made at the time of the accident would have been made
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

regardless of whether plaintiff had paid his son the $5.00
and, in fact, regardless of whether the plaintiff had even
been along on the trip. Considerable emphasis seems
to be attached both by plaintiff's attorney and the Trial
Judge to the fact that the vehicle being driven by the
defendant had earlier gone out of its way to pick up the
plaintiff and that a more expeditious route down Interstate 15 could have been followed but for the plaintiff
and his wife and grandson having been picked up. It
is difficult to understand why this is supposed to
be significant. The accident did not occur while they were
on this "side trip" to get the father. If it had, perhaps
there would be some significance to this "side t r i p " claim.
However, all of the evidence indicates that the accident
occurred where the car would have been anyway whether
the father had paid the $5.00 or whether he had even
been along.
2. John Goff did not solicit money from his parents for the trip. As indicated above under the Statement of Facts, it is clear from the mother's testimony
that the payment of the $5.00 was a spontaneous contribution. It is true that some of the testimony of the
plaintiff is to the contrary, although it is respectfully
submitted that it would be totally unreasonable to accept as a fact based upon all of the testimony at the trial
and also the testimony of the plaintiff in his pretrial deposition that, in fact, John Goff had solicited payment
from his parents.
3. It is clear that there was no pre-arrangement for
payment by the plaintiff or his wife to John Goff. That
19
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is, it is very evident that the trip was going to be made
and would have been made and that after these plans
were decided upon that the money was then paid to John
Goff. Not only did John Goff not solicit the payment
of that amount but it is apparent that the granting of
the carriage was not conditioned upon the payment of
the $5.00. (On this point, see 39A.L.E.3d at Page 1240.)
4. It is very evident from the overall factual context, and particularly the close family situation that
existed, that we are involved here with a social situation and not a commercial situation. With all due respect to those who testified at the trial, it will, of course
be evident to this Court that none of the Goff family or
their in-laws would be out anything and if the decision
were that the plaintiff was not a guest. To the contrary,
it is perfectly obvious that all of the Goffs knew that
the only loser under these circumstances would be the
insurance carrier who covered John Goffs vehicle at
the time in question. It is further to be noted that in
this case we have the strongest kind of fact situation
relating to family ties in that at the time of the accident John Goff was not only the son of the plaintiff
who was riding in his car but he was then residing with
his parents. The parents did not own an automobile and
he did. That the mother, and plaintiff's wife, was also
along on the trip as well as this young grandson of whom
they had charge, strongly indicates the family and social nature of the trip and as distinguished from its being some kind of a commercial for hire transportation.
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5. Some emphasis appears to have been laid on the
use that was actually made of the money that was paid
to John Goff by his father. That is, there was testimony
that $4.00 of this very $5.00 was used that morning to
purchase gas for the trip and that the other $1.00 was
later spent by John Goff for his lunch. It is submitted
that the specific use made of that $5.00 is irrelevant.
The evidence is clear that the trip would have been made
regardless of this payment. Firm arrangements had already been made by John Goff's then fiancee and the
other brother's then fiancee to make the trip to Salt
Lake in connection with their Tupperware work. There
is nothing to indicate that either of the girls was contributing anything for their transportation and this is
understandable considering that one was John's fiancee
and the other John's brother's fiancee, and whom both
have since married. Obviously, and considering this relationship, it is apparent that John would have allowed
the girls to make the trip without charge and regardless
of what his father had done. It is absolutely naive to
suggest under these circumstances and where the trip
was being made anyway that if the father had not paid
the $5.00 that they wouldn't have allowed him to ride.
The only reasonable interpretation that can be made is
that he would have been allowed to ride anyway and that
the payment of $5.00 was simply a courtesy payment to
the son. Moreover, John Goff testified that he was working regularly at that time and receiving a regular salary.
Thus, he had money of his own, and clearly could have
met the expense for this trip and without being paid anything by his father.
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POINT II
NO BUSINESS TRIP WAS INVOLVED AT
THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT THAT
COULD REMOVE THE PLAINTIFF FROM
THE EFFECT OF THE GUEST STATUTE.
The other finding of the Trial Court recited in his
Memorandum Decision was the following.
"(1) The trip was a business trip and not a social trip for all persons in the car except John
Goff."
Although the claimed significance of this finding or
conclusion to the Court's Decision that the plaintiff was
not a guest is not elaborated upon by the Trial Judge,
presumably it was his conclusion that plaintiff escaped
being a guest both by reason of his payment of the $5.00
and also because he was part of a business trip or joint
enterprise at the time.
This Court has ruled upon the question of a joint
enterprise and its effect upon the guest statute in Muhasey v. Aaron, 20 Utah 2d 383, 438 P.2d 702 (1968).
In that case, two young friends and college students were
traveling and working together in the Western United
States. In connection with this plan, the plaintiff, Mukasey, signed a contract with an automobile drive-away
company in Denver enabling him to drive a car to Los
Angeles and under certain conditions specified in the
contract. Thereafter, the two started out for Los Angeles and with an agreement between them whereby they
would share expenses of the automobile and they would
share the driving of the automobile to Los Angeles.

n
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While driving through Utah and with the defendant
driving, an accident occurred and both young men were
injured. The plaintiff passenger then sued the defendant driver contending that he was entitled to recover
against the driver, and based upon simple negligence
only, since the guest statute did not apply because there
was a joint enterprise. On this subject matter, Justice
Tuckett speaking for the majority stated:
"We are in accord with the general rule that if
the parties were engaged in a joint enterprise
that relationship would be sufficient to remove
the case from the provisions of the guest statute."
The court then considered what is required for this
relationship and stated as follows:
"The elements which are essential to a joint enterprise are commonly stated to be four: (1) an
agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group; (2) a common purpose to be
carried out by the group; (3) a community of
pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the
members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the
direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal
right of control."
In Mukasey, the Trial Court had granted a Summary Judgment in favor of the driver defendant. The
Supreme Court affirmed and held that this was proper
since even if the evidence was reviewed most favorably
to the plaintiff it would not show that the parties were
engaged in a joint enterprise. The Court then went on
to state:
"The evidence fails to show that the object of a
journey involved a common business purpose or

25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that a financial or pecuniary interest was involved which is essential to show that the parties
were engaged in a joint venture or joint enterprise."
In Mukasey, Justice Ellett dissented and on the
basis that the plaintiff was the host and the defendant
was the guest and that therefore the guest statute had
no application under those circumstances. Of course,
that factual situation is not involved in the instant case
and there is nothing in Justice Ellett's dissent to indicate that he disagreed with the majority on the joint
enterprise issue referred to above.
In the instant case,, it appears that the Trial Judge
believed that a business trip or joint enterprise was involved with all occupants of the car other than the owner John Groff and that therefore the guest statute did not
apply to plaintiff's claim against the defendant. If this
is what the Trial Court decided, it is apparent that the
evidence before him was totally lacking to sustain any
such finding or conclusion. It is apparent from a review of the four elements of a joint enterprise referred
to above from the Mukasey case that none are present
under the facts of the instant case and as between the
plaintiff and defendant. There was certainly no agreement between the two, either express or implied, and concerning the carriage and except possibly that which
would be involved in any kind of a social situation. Even
more obvious is that there was no "common business purpose or that a financial or pecuniary interest was in-,
volved". In fact, the purpose of the driver defendant,
Annette Doble Goff, in going to her Tupperware sales
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meeting was totally different from the purpose of plaintiff in going to the Railroad Retirement Board to discuss a claim involving prior injuries. Nor, does there
seem to have been any possible business purpose for
plaintiff's wife and their infant grandson to have been
in the car at the time. Certainly, any business purpose
the plaintiff had (i.e. going to the Railroad Retirement
Board to see about his claim) had absolutely no relationship in a business sense to what the driver or anyone else in the car was doing or intending to do. With
all due respect to Judge Gould, it is difficult to understand what he conceived to be the legal significance of
this finding quoted at the first of the Argument under
this Point II and it is even more difficult to understand
what the factual basis is for that finding.
CONCLUSION
In this case the Trial Court sitting without a jury
found that the plaintiff was not a guest since he paid
compensation for the ride and also found that the trip
was a "business trip" and that presumably therefore,
this also excluded plaintiff from being a guest. Neither
of these findings has any support in the evidence. The
factual background involved in this case concerns a family situation with the strongest possible implications of
a social, as distinguished from a commercial type of situation or a ride for hire type of situation. It is clear
that the $5.00 that was paid by the plaintiff for the ride
was merely a token of reciprocation or appreciation and
it was definitely not the chief inducement for the carriage furnished the plaintiff and if it was any induce25
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ment at all. This is so, for among other reasons, since it
is clear that the same trip would have been made regardless of this payment or even if the plaintiff had
not been present on the trip. There was no business relationship of any kind between the plaintiff and anyone
else in the car and the reasons the driver-defendant and
plaintiff-passenger were making the trip were totally
different and unrelated.
The Judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed and this Court should enter a Judgment in favor of
the defendant of no cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,

STRONG & HANNI
By DAVID K. WINDER
;

604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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